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BOYDE v. CALIFORNIA
110 S. Ct. 1190, 108 L.Ed.2d 316 (1990)
United States Supreme Court
FACTS
On January 15, 1981, Richard Boyde robbed a 7-Eleven clerk of
thirty-three dollars in Riverside, California. Boyde forced the clerk into
a waiting car and took him to a nearby orange grove. While the clerk
begged for his life, Boyde fatally shot him in the back of the head and in
the forehead. The jury found Boyde guilty of robbery, kidnapping, and
murder.
At the penalty phase of the murder trial, the judge, pursuant to the
California Jury Instructions, instructed the jurors to consider 11 statu-
tory factors to guide their discretion on whether life in prison or death
would be the appropriate penalty. The eleventh factor, a catchall phrase,
served as the foundation for much of the appeal. The eleventh factor
instructed thejury to consider, "[a]nyothercircumstancewhichextenuates
the gravity of the crime even though itis not alegal excusefor the crime."
1 CaliforniaJury Instructions, Criminal (4th ed. 1979). Once allmitigating
and aggravating evidence has been introduced, the jury weighs the
evidence. The jury instructions state that if the jury finds that the
aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances, then
the jury shall impose a sentence of death. However, if the jury finds that
the mitigating circumstances outweigh the aggravating circumstances,
then the jury shall impose a sentence of life. While not explicitly
informed, every juror is free to assign whatever moral value he or she
deems appropriate to each of the factors.
After hearing six days of penalty trial testimony, the jury returned
a verdict imposing a sentence of death. The court denied Boyde's motion
to reduce the sentence.
The Supreme Court of California affirmed the sentence, rejecting
Boyde's argument that the eleventh factor precluded the jury from
considering mitigating evidence of the defendant's background and
character. The court emphasized that the judge instructed the jury to
consider all evidence introduced during the trial. While the court agreed
that the "shall impose" language in the jury instructions could be
misinterpreted, it decided that in this case the jury was adequately
informed.
HOLDING
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and affirmed
the lower court's holding. Specifically, the Court held that: (1) the
mandatory instruction "shall impose" did not prevent the jury from
making an individual assessment of the appropriateness of the death
penalty as required by the eighth amendment; (2) a "reasonable likeli-
hood" was the appropriate standard of review to determine if jury
instructions were ambiguous enough to be subject to erroneous inter-
pretation; and (3) there was no reasonable likelihood that the jury
misinterpreted thejury instructions so as to preclude consideration of the
defendant's background and character as mitigating evidence.
ANALYSIS/APPLICATION IN VIRGINIA
The Court first rejected Boyde's claim that the "shall impose"
language in the jury instructions foreclosed the jury from determining
whether the "absolute weight" of the aggravating factors warranted the
death penalty. In this 5-4 decision, the Court held that the safety valve
of allowing the jury to impose life even if it finds that the aggravating
circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances is not a consti-
tutional requirement.
This follows the reasoning employed inBlystone v.Pennsylvania,
110 S. Ct. 1078, 1196 (1990), where the Court reiterated that the eighth
amendment requirement of individualized sentencing is satisfied if the
jury can consider and give effect to the mitigating evidence. Assessment
of the severity of the aggravating factor is not required. Blystone 110 S.
Ct. at 1196 (See case summary of Blystone v. Commonwealth, Capital
Defense Digest, this issue). From the decisions in Blystone and Boyde,
the next logical argument for the capital defense attorney will be to
address whether the present instructions allow the jury to give effect to
the mitigating evidence.
In holding that there is no constitutional requirement that the jury
have unfettered sentencing discretion which allows itto impose life even
if the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances,
the Court implied that it may permit states to go even further in limiting
the jury's discretion. It noted that a state is free to structure the
consideration of mitigating evidence to achieve a more rational and
equitable administration of death sentences.
Before the Court could entertain Boyde's second argument, it had
to establish the standard ofreview for ambiguous jury instructions which
could lead to erroneous interpretation of the law and subsequent mis-
application by the jury. The Court has applied several standards of
review in the past, ranging from what a reasonable juror could have
understood the instructions to mean to a substantial possibility that the
jury may have rested its verdict on improper interpretations of the jury
instructions. While suggesting thattheremaynotbe substantialdifferences
between these standards of review, the Court determined that the proper
standard is "whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury has
applied the challenged jury instructions in a way that prevents the
consideration of constitutionally relevant evidence." Boyde, 110 S. Ct.
at 1190. The Court decided that reviewing how the jury would under-
stand instructions rather than how an individual, hypothetical juror
would react to the instructions best served the concerns of finality and
accuracy.
In dissent, Justice Marshall, writing forJustices Brennan,Blackmun
and Stevens, argued that under the majority's standard of reasonable
likelihood, Boyde's death sentence would be upheld even if the jury
reasonably could have believed that it could not have considered
mitigating evidence of the defendant's character and background.
In applying the reasonable likelihood standard to Boyde's argu-
ment that the eleventh factor, the catchall phrase, prohibited the jury
from considering and giving effect to non-crime related mitigation, the
Court highlighted the fact that the defense introduced four hundred
pages of evidence pertaining to the defendant's background and char-
acter. Furthermore, the Court emphasized that two of the other ten
statutory factors listed for jury consideration required an examination of
past conduct. When the Court considered the eleventh factor of the jury
instruction with all the other instructions, it concluded that it was
improbable that the jury understood the instructions to preclude con-
sideration of non-crime related evidence.
The Court reached this conclusion even though the prosecutor
made statements at trial that reinforced the improper interpretation of the
eleventh factor. In his closing argument, the prosecutor made sugges-
tions which had the effect of minimizing the relevance of defendant's
background and character. In response to this concern, the Court stated
that closing arguments are not viewed as definitions of the law in the
manner thatjury instructions are perceived. Furthermore, the prosecutor
did not suggest that the defendant's background and character were
irrelevant, but only urged the jury that aside from his background and
character, the defendant should still be held responsible for his actions.
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The Court's relaxed standard of review is part of a series of proposed jury instructions (a) that it may consider non-crime related
holdings that highlight the increased importance of the trial itself, evidence and base a sentence of life on that evidence and (b) that in
Capital defendants in Virginia are no less worthy than Boyde of six days Virginia the jury may fix punishment at life even if satisfied that both
of mitigation testimony. Such presentation in Virginia often consumes aggravating factors have been proven.
less than a day. Furthermore, Virginia trial courts are not even required
to provide capital juries as much information about the meaning and Summary and analysis by:
scope of mitigation as is contained in California's catchall phrase. It is Steven K. Herndon
the duty of counsel to inform the jury through evidence, argument, and
McKOY v. NORTH CAROLINA
110 S. Ct. 1227, 108 L.Ed.2d 369 (1990)
United States Supreme Court
FACTS
The Superior Court of Stanly County, North Carolina, convicted
DockMcKoyofthefirst-degreemurderofadeputy sheriff and sentenced
him to death in accordance with N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-2000 (1988).
McKoy appealed his sentence to the North Carolina Supreme Court,
basing his constitutional challenge of North Carolina's sentencing
procedures on Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367 (1989). See case sum-
mary of Mills v. Maryland, Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 1, No. 1, p. 11
(1988). In Mills, the United States Supreme Court reversed a death
sentence imposed under Maryland's capital punishment statute because
the sentencing scheme could have precluded ajury from considering any
mitigating evidence unless all 12 jurors agreed on the existence of a
particular mitigating circumstance. McKoy v.North Carolina, 110 S. Ct.
1227 (1990). TheNorth CarolinaSupreme Court affirmedboth McKoy's
conviction and sentence. The United States Supreme Court granted
certiorari. Id.
NORTH CAROLINA'S SENTENCING SCHEME
In the sentencing phase of McKoy's trial, the trial court instructed
the jury, both orally and in a written verdict form, to determine unani-
mously four issues which would ultimately be used in the determination
of the sentence. The instructions with Issue One required that the jury
indicate "yes" to every aggravating circumstance listed that it had found
unanimously from the evidence and beyond areasonable doubtand "no"
as to all circumstances not so found. The jury found as aggravating
circumstances that McKoy previously had been convicted of a felony
involving violence and that the instant murder was committed against a
deputy sheriff while engaged in the performance of his official duties.
Issue Two similarly required the jury to agree unanimously on the
existence of every mitigating circumstance listed and to indicate its
decision by marking "yes" or "no" on the verdict form. The jury found
as mitigating that McKoy's capacity to appreciate the criminality of his
conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law was
impaired. The jury also found that his borderline intellectual abilities
were mitigating. However, the jury did not unanimously agree on the
existence of several other mitigating factors raised by the defendant and
he was therefore denied consideration of them.
Because the jury found the existence of mitigating circumstances,
it was instructed to proceed to Issue Three which required the jury to
decide unanimously whetherthe mitigating circumstances unanimously
found in Issue Two were insufficient to outweigh the aggravating
circumstances found by the jury in Issue One. The jury answered "yes"
to this question and so proceeded to the final Issue.
Issue Four asked whether the jury unanimously found beyond a
reasonable doubt that the aggravating circumstances found by the jury
were sufficiently substantial to warrant the imposition of the death
penalty when weighed against the mitigating circumstances found by
the jury. Again, the jury answered "yes." In accordance with the verdict
form and instructions, thejury subsequently made abinding recommen-
dation of death.
In ruling on McKoy's direct appeal of his sentence, the North
Carolina Supreme Court rejected McKoy's challenge which was based
on Mills. Id. at 1228. The court distinguished North Carolina's sentenc-
ing scheme from the Maryland scheme, the subject of Mills. State v.
McKoy, 372 S.E.2d 12 (N.C. 1988). Maryland's scheme, declared
invalid by the Supreme Court, required the jury to impose the death
penalty if itfound at least one aggravating circumstance and no mitigating
circumstances or, alternatively, if it unanimously agreed that the miti-
gating circumstances did not outweigh the aggravating factors. Id. at 33.
The North Carolina Supreme Court emphasized that Issue 4 allowed a
jury to return a recommendation of life imprisonment if it felt that the
aggravating circumstances did not call for the death penalty, even if the
jury found aggravating factors and no mitigating factors. Id.
HOLDING
The Supreme Courtfound thatNorth Carolina's sentencing scheme
impermissibly limited the jurors' consideration of mitigating evidence.
McKoy, 110 S. Ct. at 1228. The unanimity requirement is a violation of
the eighth amendment protection against cruel and unusual punishment
because it allows one juror to prevent others from giving effect to
evidence that thejuror might believe suggests a sentence less than death.
Both Issues Three and Fourrestrictthejury's consideration of mitigating
factors to those found unanimously under Issue Two. Id. at 1233. The
Court emphasized that, in contrast to the narrowly defined standards on
which a sentencer may rely to impose the death penalty, the Constitution
strictly limits a State's ability to narrow the sentencer's discretion to
consider relevant evidence that might persuade it to decline to impose
the death penalty. Id. at 1234 (citing Penry v. Lynaugh, 109 S. Ct. 2934
(1989)).
Mills and McKoy require that each juror be permitted to consider
any evidence in mitigation of the offense. See Skipper v. South Carolina,
476 U.S. 1 (1986), Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982), and
Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978) (death penalty schemes must allow
consideration of any aspect of the defendant's character or record and
any circumstances that the defendant offers as a basis for a sentence less
than death). Additionally, Mills and McKoy require that each juror be
permitted to give effect to mitigating evidence when deciding the ulti-
mate question of life or death. McKoy, 110 S. Ct. at 1233.
The High Court vacated McKoy's death sentence and remanded
the case to the North Carolina Supreme Court for resentencing.
ANALYSIS/APPLICATION IN VIRGINIA
McKoy is not directly applicable to Virginia because Virginia's
sentencing scheme does not formally require jurors to weigh the mitigat-
ing circumstances against the aggravating circumstances to determine
